Abstract
Introduction
In the field of computation, there have been many approaches for enhancing the parallelism and distribution of resources for the advancement and acceleration of data utilization. Data clusters, distributed database management systems, data grids, and many other mechanisms have been introduced. Cloud computing is currently emerging as a mechanism for high level computation, as well as serving as a storage system for resources. Clouds allow users to pay for whatever resources they use, allowing users to increase or decrease the amount of resources requested as needed. Cloud servers can be used to motivate the initiation of a business and ease its financial burden in terms of Capital Expenditure and Operational Expenditure [10] .
Cloud computing has been introduced as providing a large framework that is beneficial for clients which utilize all or some aspects of it. Cloud computing can be thought of as composed of different layers, depending on the distribution of the resources. In this view, the CPU, memory and other hardware components reside at the bottom-most layer, called the Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) layer. The layer which is responsible for hosting different environments for customer specific services is the middle layer, known as the Platform as the Service (PaaS) layer. Finally, the topmost layer is the Software as a Service (SaaS) layer, where cloud service accessing takes place through the Web service and web browsers. Amazon EC2 is a well known example of IaaS, Google App engine is an example of PaaS and salesforce.com is an example of SaaS.
It is clear that cloud computing is the next step in the evolution of on-demand information technology services and products. The ancestors of cloud computing have existed for a long time now, such as the following distributed systems: AEC08, Con08, Fos04, Had08, IBM07c, Net06 and VCL04 etc. The term cloud computing became popular in October 2007 after the announcement of IBM's and Google's collaboration on Loh07 and IBM07a, which was followed by IBM's announcement of the "Blue Cloud" effort.
Cloud security is a complex issue, involving the different levels of the cloud, external and internal threats, and responsibilities that are divided between the user, the provider and even a third party. The focus of this paper is to identify and describe prime security attacks on clouds. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II a short introduction about cloud security is provided followed by some specific cloud security issues and related work in Section III. Then Section IV focuses on the root causes of those security issues and approaches are presented in Section V to solve these problems. Finally the conclusions are presented with thoughts for our future work and improvements in Section VI.
Introduction to cloud security
Security threats on cloud users are both external and internal. Many of the external threats are similar to the threats that large data centers have already faced. This security concern responsibility is divided among the cloud users, the cloud vendors and the third party vendor involved in ensuring secure sensitive software or configurations.
If the application level security is the responsibility of the cloud user, then the provider is responsible for the physical security and also for enforcing external firewall policies. Security for intermediate layers of the software stack is shared between the user and the operator. The lower the level of abstraction exposed to the user, the more responsibility goes with it [18] .
Besides the external security issues, the cloud does possess some internal security issues as well. Cloud providers must guard theft or denial-of-service attacks by users. In other words, users need to be protected from each other. Virtualization is the primary mechanism that today's clouds have adapted because of its powerful defense and protection against most of the attempts by users to attack each other or the underlying cloud infrastructure. However, not all the resources are virtualized and not all virtualization environments are bug free. Virtualization software contains bugs that allow virtualized code to "break loose" to some extent. Incorrect network virtualization may allow user code access to sensitive portions of the provider's infrastructure or to the resources of others.
The cloud should also be protected from the provider. By definition, the provider controls the bottom layer of the software stack, which effectively circumvents most known security techniques. The one important exception is the risk of inadvertent data loss. In addition, if any kind of failure occurs, it is not clear who is the responsible party. A failure can occur for various reasons: 1) due to hardware, which is in the Infrastructure as a Service layer of the cloud; 2) due to malware in software, which is in the Software as a Service layer of the cloud; or 3) due to the customer's application running some kind of malicious code, the malfunctioning of the customer's applications or a third party invading a client's application by injecting bogus data. Whatever the reason, a failure can result in a dispute between the provider and the clients.
Cloud security issues and related works
In this section we depict some prominent security issues in cloud computing today, along with the techniques applied by adversaries to intrude in the cloud. Also presented are the after effects when the intruder has made a successful compilation of his/her malicious program and hampered the regular functioning of the cloud system. We describe existing solutions and their pitfalls. Our observations in this paper will be specific to each issue rather than imposing security as a whole.
2.1.1
Soap Messages As web service (WS) technology is the mostly used technology in the field of SOA in the Cloud, the WS-security system should be rigid enough to optimize the security attacks from different adversaries. Security attacks can involve SOAP messages. SOAP is an XML based messaging framework, used to exchange encoded information (e.g. web service request and response) over a variety of protocols (e.g. HTTP, SMTP, MIME). It allows a program running in one system to call a program running in another system and it is independent of any programming model [22] .
As of now, two common attacks with SOAP messages are the Denial of Service and Wrapping attack. In the latter one, the wrapping element signature attack is the main picture for WS-security in large data centers like a cloud or grid system. So in that light, there are some IT companies who have accomplished some tasks thus far to prevent their system from such kinds of attacks. But even a company like Amazon had weaknesses in the SOAP request validation component in their EC2 (Elastic Compute Cloud), and thus, allowed unprivileged actions to take place in the cloud on a victim's account.
We now present an example using Amazon Web Service (AWS) [16] technology and its security. In the beginning, while registering, the customer has to provide a Self-Signed Certificate, and a randomly generated RSA to the AWS. If not, then a publicly defined certificate can be sent to the AWS with the signature. Here the AWS provides some command line tools to search the virtual machine images (AMI-Amazon Machine Images), to run those images, to monitor them and finally terminate some of the AMIs. These SOAP messages can be modified by the developers. The SOAP Header contains two elements. One is the BinarySecurityToken which contains the certificate mentioned above. The second is the TimeStamp which will contain the information of the creation and expiration of this SOAP. If the SOAP message is transferred through an unsecured layer, then the SOAP Body (inside the SOAP: Envelope) as well as the TimeStamp inside the SOAP Header needs to be signed. If the transport layer is secured then only the TimeStamp needs to be signed.
Since the channel is protected by means of SSL/TLS by default, this is largely an ineffective attack vector. Also, as the EC2 Web services allow access via simple HTTP as well, a passive attack would be sufficient to get in possession of such a request. For a wrapping attack to be successful, the only requirement here is that the bogus Body needs to have exactly the same ID as the original one.
2.1.2
Multi-core OS systems Factored operating systems (fos) are designed to address the challenges found in systems, such as cloud computing and many core systems, and can provide a framework from which to consider cloud security. In reality there are several classes of systems having similarities to fos: traditional microkernels, distributed OS's and cloud computing infrastructure. Traditional microkernels include Mach [2] and L4. Instead of simple exploitation of parallelism between servers, fos seeks to distribute and parallelize within a server for a single high level function [1] . The main motive of fos was to compel the scalability, elasticity of demand, fault tolerance and resolve difficulties in programming a large system. For a large system like a cloud, an OS such as fos is the perfect match to take care of all the above issues. In many a core multi processor system, the OS manages and monitors the resources, and the scheduling task. So in the case of scalability, an application is factored into a service, then it is also factored in additional services to be distributed between service specific servers or a group of servers. Figure  1 illustrates the fos system functionality.
As mentioned previously, the resources are managed by the OS. So the cores are dynamically distributed and allocated for each of the services between the servers. A periodic message is monitored to verify if all the servers are working soundly or not. If one of the messages is missing, then a server fault is detected and a decision can be taken to appoint a new server for that specific task.
Unlike early cloud and cluster systems, fos provides a single system image to an application. This means that the application interface is that of a single machine while the OS implements this interface across several machines in the cloud. Aspects of fos can be used to secure cloud systems in and is discussed in Section V.
2.1.3
Securing Code, Control Flow and Image Repositories Each user in the cloud is provided with an instance of a Virtual Machine (VM): an OS, application, etc. Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) was proposed in [3] to monitor VMs together with Livewire, a prototype IDS that uses VMI to monitor VMs. A monitoring library named XenAccess is for a guest OS running on top of Xen that applies the VMI and virtual disk monitoring capabilities to access the memory state and disk activity of a target OS. These approaches require that the system must be clean when monitoring is started, which is a flaw and needs further investigation in VMI.
Lares [6] is a framework that can control an application running in an untrusted guest VM by inserting protected hooks into the execution flow of a process to be monitored. Since the guest OS needs to be modified on the fly to insert hooks, this technique may not be applicable in some customized OS.
All of these works have some flaws when security is considered in a cloud. So encapsulation of the cloud system in a secured environment is mandatory.
2.1.4
Accountability in clouds Making the cloud accountable means that the cloud will be trustable, reliable and customers will be satisfied with their monthly or yearly charge for using the provider's cloud. In Section IV we discuss several types of attacks on clouds, all of which have an impact on the accountability of a cloud.
In this section we describe some of the work that has been done on accountability.
Trusted computing [19] is an approach to achieve some of the characteristics mentioned above to make a cloud accountable. Typically, it requires trusting the correctness of large and complex codebases.
A simple yet remarkably powerful tool of selfish and malicious participants in a distributed system is "equivocation": making conflicting statements to others. A small, trusted component is TrInc [20] 
Security issue causes
Next, we identify different kinds of attacks in a cloud: a) Wrapping attack, b) Malware-Injection attack, c) Flooding attack, and in the face of these attacks the need for Accountability checking. We describe each of these prime security issues in cloud systems and depict their root causes. For a wrapping attack, the adversary does its deception before the translation of the SOAP message in the TLS (Transport Layer Service) layer. If the Body is included with a new Wrapper element inside the SOAP Header, then a simple validation can easily disclose the original SOAP message. Using this privilege an adversary makes a duplication of the message, as in Figure 3 [10] , and sends it to the server as a legitimate user. The basic function for the attacker is to wrap the total message in a new header, the <Wrapper> element. Then the wrapper contains the original message body, which is the legitimate request from the user, and makes the <Security> as the new header element for that message. So when the validation session takes place, the server checks the authentication by the ID and integrity checking for the message. The Bogus elements and its contents are ignored by the recipient since this header is unknown, but the signature is still acceptable because the element at reference URI matches the same value as in the wrapper element.
There are other ways to detect a security breach through Wrapping. As discovered by Schaad and Rits, the inline approach [9] is one of them. There are some protected properties:
 Number of child elements of SOAP: Envelope  Number of header elements inside Header  Successor and Predecessor of each signed object If an attacker changes the structure of the message and one of these properties is modified, the attack can be detected. This approach is known as schema validation. In this approach, the WS-Policy standardization will be adapted in the SOAP validation and the properties mentioned above will be injected as the SOAP header.
Since cloud computing is a new area in the field of SOA, it is anticipated these approaches to verify the SOAP message will experience many more obstacles.
2.2.2
Malware-injection attack problem In the cloud system, as the client's request is executed based on authentication and authorization, there is a huge possibility of meta data exchange between the web server and web browser. An attacker can take advantage during this exchange of metadata. Either the adversary makes his own instance or the adversary may try to intrude with malicious code. In this case, either the injected malicious service or code appears as one of the valid instance services running in the cloud. If the attacker is successful, then the cloud service will suffer from eavesdropping and deadlocks, which forces a legitimate user to wait until the completion of a job which was not generated by the user. This type of attack is also known as a meta-data spoofing attack.
2.2.3
Flooding attack problem In a cloud system, all the computational servers work in a service specific manner, with internal communication between them. Whenever a server is overloaded or has reached the threshold limit, it transfers some of its jobs to a nearest and similar service-specific server to offload itself. This sharing approach makes the cloud more efficient and faster executing requests.
When an adversary has achieved the authorization to make a request to the cloud, then he/she can easily create bogus data and pose these requests to the cloud server. When processing these requests, the server first checks the authenticity of the requested jobs. Non-legitimate requests must be checked to determine their authenticity, but checking consumes CPU utilization, memory and engages the IaaS to a great extent, and as a result the server will offload its services to another server. Again, the same thing will occur and the adversary is successful in engaging the whole cloud system just by interrupting the usual processing of one server, in essence flooding the system.
2.2.4
Accountability check problem The payment method in a cloud System is "No use No bill". When a customer launches an instance, the duration of the instance, the amount of data transfer in the network and the number of CPU cycles per user are all recorded. Based on this recorded information, the customer is charged. So, when an attacker has engaged the cloud with a malicious service or runs malicious code, which consumes a lot of computational power and storage from the cloud server, then the legitimate account holder is charged for this kind of computation. As a result, a dispute arises and the provider's business reputation is hampered
Possible security approaches
In this section we discuss possible solutions for the three mostly probable attacks: wrapping attacks, malware-injection attacks and flooding attacks, as well as an accountability check for the Cloud system.
Wrapping attack solution
In this regard some additional precautions should be considered for the reliability of the SOAP message. Two approaches can be adapted by the registered users in this message passing:  A Self signed Certificate and RSA key can be generated for convenience.  Registering a public certificate with the provider. These certificates will be authenticated by a trusted CA.
We propose that the Security Header must be signed while passing this message through an unsecured transport layer. When it is received in the destination, the validation is checked first. If the Timestamp (discussed in Section III.A) is not reasonable, then it can be assumed that security has been breached, actions can be taken accordingly and the SOAP message can be ignored.
2.3.2
Malware-injection attack solution The client's VM is created and stored in the image repository system of the cloud. These applications are always considered with high integrity. We propose to consider the integrity in the hardware level, because it will be very difficult for an attacker to intrude in the IaaS level. Our proposal is to utilize a FAT-like (File Allocation Table) system architecture due to its straightforward technique which is supported by virtually all existing operating systems. From this FAT-like table we can find the application that a customer is running. A Hypervisor can be deployed in the provider's end. The Hypervisor is responsible for scheduling all the instances, but before scheduling it will check the integrity of the instance from the FAT-like table of the customer's VM. Now the question is how the FAT-like table will be utilized to do the integrity checking. The IDT (Interrupt Descriptor Table) can be used in the primary stage to detect. Firstly, the IDT location can be found from the CPU registers; then an analysis of the IDT contents and the hash values of in-memory code blocks can determine the running OS in the VM. Finally, using the information of the running OS with the appropriate algorithms, all the running instances can be identified and then validated by the Hypervisor. So in Figure 4 (which is based on [4] ), it is observed that the OS of the VM2 can be easily detected.
2.3.3
Flooding attack solution For preventing a flooding attack, our proposed approach is to consider all the servers in the cloud system as a fleet of servers. Each fleet of servers will be designated for a specific type of job, like one fleet engaged for file system type requests, another for memory management and another for core computation related jobs, etc. In this approach, all the servers in the fleet will have internal communication among themselves through message passing, as in Figure 5 . So when a server is overloaded, a new server will be deployed in the fleet and the name server, which has the complete records of the current states of the servers, will update the destination for the requests with the newly included server. As mentioned in the previous section, a Hypervisor can also be utilized for the scheduling among these fleets. The Hypervisor will do the validity checking and if any unauthorized code is interrupting the usual computation in the cloud system, then the system will detect the instance by introspection. In this way, the flooding attack can be mitigated to an extent. If the Hypervisor is locally breached, which would require a misfeasor, then further analysis and efforts will be required to secure the Hypervisor.
Additionally, a PID can be appended in the messaging, which will justify the identity of the legitimate customer's request. The PID can be checked by the Hypervisor in the assignment of instances to the fleet of servers. This PID can be encrypted with the help of various approaches, such as implementing hash values or by using the RSA.
2.3.4
Accountability check solution The provider does not know the details of the customer's applications and it does not have the privilege to test the integrity of the application running in the cloud. On the other hand, customers do not know the infrastructure of the provider's cloud. If a customer is charged due to a malware attack or a failure, then the customer has no option to defend himself.
There can be unusual phenomenon, such as a dramatic increase in a current account usage balance all of a sudden or charges for instances at a specific time when the customer was away from the cloud. In this case, an investigation should take place before charging the customer, because an adversary may be responsible for these unusual activities. In our approach the following features will be ensured in the provider's end before launching any instance of a customer:
 Identities  Secure Records  Auditing  Evidence Firstly, before starting the instance, the identity of the legitimate customer should be checked by the Hypervisor. Secondly, all the message passing and data transfer in the network will be stored securely and uninterrupted in that specific node. Hence, when the auditing takes place, all the necessary information can be retrieved. Also, the evidence must be strong enough to clarify the recorded events, so the AUDIT will have the following properties: completeness, accuracy and verifiability. These properties ensure that when there is a security attack it is reported immediately, no false alarm will be reported and the evidence can be scrutinized by a trusted third party who will commit the task of AUDIT from a neutral point of view.
In some cases, there can be a conflict between privacy and accountability, since the latter produces a detailed record of the machines' actions that can be inspected by a third party. An accountable cloud can maintain separate logs for each of its customers and make it visible to only the customer who owns it. Also, the log available to customers will not have any confidential information about the infrastructure of the provider from which the IaaS can be inferred by the AUDITOR.
Conclusions
Cloud computing is revolutionizing how information technology resources and services are used and managed, but this revolution comes with new problems. We have depicted some crucial and well known security attacks and have proposed some potential solutions in this paper, such as utilizing the FAT-like table and a Hypervisor.
In the future, we will extend our research by providing implementations and producing results to justify our concepts of security for cloud computing. The concepts we have discussed here will help to build a strong architecture for security in the field of cloud computation. This kind of structured security will also be able to improve customer satisfaction to a great extent and will attract more investors in this cloud computation concept for industrial as well as future research farms. Lastly, we propose to build strong theoretical concepts for security in order to build a more generalized architecture to prevent different kinds of attacks.
